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Accounting conservatism and earnings informativeness are important elements in 
good quality financial reporting (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Beekes, Pope, & Young, 
2004; Fan & Wong, 2002). Accounting conservatism requires a higher degree of 
verification for recognizing good news as gains than bad news as losses in financial 
statements. This implies that bad news is recognized as losses more quickly than good 
news as gains. Accounting conservatism is an effective mechanism to address agency 
problems. Agency problems arise due to the separation of ownership and control of 
firm operations, whereby managers have the incentives to take measures to transfer 
wealth to themselves. As accounting conservatism understates earnings and net assets, 
it reduces the ability of managers to take actions for their own benefit. Greater 
accounting conservatism is expected to be observed in firms when separation of 
ownership and control is greater (Lafond & Roychowdhury, 2008; Watts, 2003). 
Earnings informativeness refers to the extent earnings recognize information that is 
incorporated in stock prices. It is measured by earnings and stock returns relationship. 
A strong earnings and stock returns relationship is expected when firms produce high 
quality earnings. 
 
Existing studies indicate that accounting conservatism and earnings informativeness 
are associated with good corporate governance. For example, Beekes et al. (2004) 
report that board structure with strong corporate governance mechanism is associated 
with accounting conservatism. They show that firms with higher proportion of outside 
directors are associated with higher accounting conservatism. Ahmed and Duellman 
(2007) find that accounting conservatism is negatively related to the percentage of 
inside directors on the board, and accounting conservatism is positively related to the 
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percentage of outside directors’ shareholdings. Vafeas (2000) reports that earnings 
informativeness is higher for firms with smaller boards. In a related study, Bushman 
et al. (2004) show that boards tend to adopt stronger corporate governance mechanism 
when earnings informativeness is low. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the association between ownership structure 
and accounting conservatism and earnings informativeness. Ownership structure is an 
area of research that remains unsettled. For example, Fan and Wong (2002) and Ball 
et al. (2003) document that low financial reporting quality is due to concentrated 
ownership. However, recent studies indicate that concentrated ownership is associated 
with high financial reporting quality. Wang (2006) reports that family firms are 
inclined to report high quality financial information. They are not likely to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour in reporting earnings as it could damage the families’ 
reputation. The result is supported by Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan (2007) who find 
that family firms report higher earnings quality than non-family firms. Similarly, in 
Malaysia, Wan Nordin (2009) finds that family firms are also associated with high 
corporate transparency. 
 
Specifically, in this paper we examine accounting conservatism and earnings 
informativeness for family firms and non-family firms. In family firms, owners 
control the operations of the firms. Therefore, agency cost is expected to be less 
severe in family firms. Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) show that accounting 
conservatism is negatively related with managerial ownership. Based on the finding 
and the agency theory, it is expected that the level of accounting conservatism to be 
lower for family firms than it is for non-family firms. The quality of financial 
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reporting of family firms is often regarded as of low quality. This is due to 
entrenchment effect whereby it is believed that owners take measures for self-interest 
purpose. However, recent studies (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Wan Nordin, 
2009; Wang, 2006) indicate that the quality of financial reporting of family firms is 
not of lower quality than that of non-family firms. Instead, findings suggest that the 
quality of financial reporting for family firms is higher than it is for non-family firms. 
Hence, based on recent findings, we expect that earnings informativeness is higher for 
family firms than it is for non-family firms. Using a sample of Malaysian firms for the 
period 2000-2007, we find that both family firms and non-family firms recognize bad 
news as losses more quickly than good news as gains. The results suggest that 
accounting conservatism exists in both family firms and non-family firms. Our results 
also show that there is no difference in the level of accounting conservatism between 
family firms and non-family firms. With respect to earnings informativeness, we find 
that the association between earnings and stock returns is stronger for family firms 
than for non-family firms.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior studies and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research method and Section 4 
presents the results. Section 5 is the conclusion. 
 
2.0 PRIOR STUDIES AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1  Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure determines the distribution of power between managers and 
shareholders. The concentration of ownership would be beneficial to firms as large 
shareholdings allow for greater monitoring of managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
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Thus, the absence of separation between ownership and control reduces conflicts of 
interest and increases shareholder value (Morck et al., 1988). 
 
In East Asian countries, firms are usually controlled by families or the State. Control 
is obtained primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management 
(La Porta et al., 1999). A study by Claessens et al. (2000) in nine East Asian countries 
(Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Taiwan) reports that more than two thirds of the firms are controlled by 
a single shareholder. About 60% of concentrated firms’ top management is related to 
the family of the controlling shareholder and there is extensive family control in more 
than half of East Asian firms. Yammeesri and Lodh (2004) study 243 non-financial 
firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand for the period 1993-1996. They find 
that firms with controlling ownership have higher performance than those with non-
controlling ownership. Results also show that family-controlling ownership has a 
positive and significant relationship with firm performance. 
 
The ownership structure of many Malaysian firms is concentrated and the shares are 
held by the state, families or individuals (Zhuang, Edwards & Capulong, 2001). 
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) by the World Bank 
indicate that 67.2% of the shares of Malaysian firms are owned by family members; 
37.4% of the shares are owned by controlling shareholders and 13.4% of the shares 
are state controlled. A study by Hui (1981) find that 0.8 % of shareholders own 69% 
of the total shares of the 62 largest Malaysian firms during the period 1974-1976. La 
Porta et al. (1998) evidence that 54% of ownership is owned by the three largest 
owners who are from the ten largest Malaysian non-financial listed companies. The 
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findings by Hui (1981), La Porta et al. (1998) and Zhuang et al. (2001) demonstrate 
that Malaysian firms have a high degree of ownership concentration. A survey 
conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (1998) shows that almost 97% of Malaysian 
private limited companies (PLCs) are substantial shareholders
1
 with 33% of them 
involve in management. Abdullah (2001) find that the single largest shareholder holds 
36% of the firm’s shares. Che-Ahmad et al. (2003) study 236 PLCs and find that the 
block-holders hold 60.75% of shareholdings. A study by Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir 
(2004) determine that the average shareholding by the top 20 shareholders is 73%. 
Tam and Tan (2007) claim that concentrated ownership affects firm performance. 
Firm characteristics such as firm age, size and sector also influence firm performance. 
A study by Zainal Abidin et al. (2009) also shows that directors in Malaysia have 
sizeable ownership stakes in the company compared to their counterparts in Western 
economies such as Sweden and the UK (Ho & Williams, 2003). This is perhaps due to 
the higher number of family-owned and managed companies in Malaysia. 
 
2.2 Family Firms 
Family firms have special characteristics that distinct themselves from non-family 
firms. In family firms, ownership is concentrated and managerial ownership is high. 
The management mainly consists of family members and board of director is less 
open to outsider (Corbetta & Montemerlo, 1999). Family spirit is strong in family 
firms whereby, it serves as a monitoring and controlling mechanism (Fama & Jenssen, 
1983). Moreover, family traits influence the governance of family firms (Mishra, 
Randoy & Jenssen, 2001). The involvement of family members in the management 
allows them to have extensive knowledge in the operations of the firms. 
                                                    
1
 A substantial shareholder is defined as having at least 5% (direct or indirectly) of the aggregate of 
nominal amounts of all the voting shares in the firm as defined in Section 69D, Companies Act 1965. 
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Consequently, family members are able to make flexible, timely and efficient decision 
makings (James, 1999). In addition, the presence of family members in the 
management benefits family firms in term of lower cost of debt, and therefore family 
firms are more likely to maximize shareholders’ values (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 
2003).  
 
Agency cost is expected to be less severe for family firms compared to non-family 
firms. Agency cost arises due to the separation of ownership and control. However, as 
family members control the operations of the firms, they become dominant and 
entrenched. According to entrenchment effect, owners are more likely to engage in 
transactions that benefit themselves. As owners have control on firms’ financial 
reporting, they have the incentives and the opportunities to manage accounting 
numbers for self-interest purpose. Consequently, investors do not trust reported 
earnings as they expect owners manipulate earnings, and hence, this undermines the 
credibility of earnings and lowers earnings informativeness (Fan & Wong, 2002). It is 
also argued that family firm structure produces low quality financial reporting. This is 
due to the fact that debt tends to be private for family firms. Capital requirement is 
usually financed by bank loans. Information asymmetry more likely is resolved by 
private communication. Therefore, there is no demand for high quality financial 
reporting (Ball et al., 2003). 
 
However, recent studies document that family firms are associated with high quality 
financial reporting. Wang (2006) argues that due to the entrenchment effect, users of 
financial statements demand family firms to produce high quality earnings. Family 
firms are concerned with families’ reputation. Therefore, they have the incentives to 
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report earnings of high quality in order to protect the families’ reputation. Wang 
examines the quality of earnings for S&P 500 firms and finds that earnings are more 
informative for family firms. Ali et al. (2007) contend that family firms acknowledge 
that market is aware of their activities and therefore they are not inclined to engage in 
activities that benefit themselves. They are concerned that market might penalize their 
rent seeking activities in the form of lower equity value. Accordingly, family firms 
have the incentive to produce high quality earnings. Ali et al. find that earnings of 
family firms are of higher quality than that of non-family firms. In a related study, 
Wan Nordin (2009) examines whether family firms are associated with greater 
corporate transparency. He reports that corporate transparency is higher for family 
firms than it is for non-family firms. 
 
2.3 Accounting Conservatism and Earnings Informativeness 
Accounting conservatism recognizes economic losses immediately in the financial 
statements, but it requires higher verification standards for recognition of economic 
gains. Accounting conservatism is a good element of high quality financial reporting 
(Ball et al., 2003). It is argued that accounting conservatism is an effective mechanism 
to reduce agency cost as it curbs managers’ opportunistic behaviour. It reduces the 
ability of managers to overstate earnings and net assets (Watts, 2003). Furthermore, 
accounting conservatism discourages managers to invest in negative NPV projects or 
poorly performing investments as they are unable to defer recognition of losses to the 
future (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). 
 
Beekes et al. (2004) examined the level of accounting conservatism between firms 
with a higher proportion of outside directors and firms with fewer outside directors. 
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Corporate governance for firms with a higher proportion of outside directors is 
regarded as superior than that for firms with fewer outside directors. Beekes et al. find 
that accounting conservatism is higher for firms that have good corporate governance 
mechanisms. Firms with a higher proportion of outside directors recognize losses on a 
timelier basis than firms with fewer outside directors. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) 
obtain similar results. They report that accounting conservatism is high for firms with 
high percentage of outside directors’ shareholdings. For firms with high percentage of 
inside directors’ shareholdings, accounting conservatism is low. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) argue that the governance structure and monitoring mechanisms are different 
between private and public firms. Thus, difference in accounting conservatism 
between private and public firms is expected. Ball and Shivakumar report that 
accounting conservatism is lower for private firms than that for public firms. Ball et 
al. (2003) use accounting conservatism as a measure for financial reporting quality in 
examining the quality of financial reporting. They found that the quality of financial 
reporting is not determined solely by the quality of accounting standards. Instead, 
institutional structure is more important that it provides incentive for the preparer of 
financial statements whether to produce high or low quality financial reporting.  
 
Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) relate the level of accounting conservatism with 
ownership structure. Agency cost is more severe when the interests of managers and 
shareholders are less aligned. Lafond and Roychowdhury argued that accounting 
conservatism is employed in firms when the interests of managers and shareholders 
are less aligned in order to curb agency cost. Therefore, it is expected that the demand 
for accounting conservatism is higher when managerial ownership is low. They show 
10 
 
that accounting conservatism is high when managerial ownership is low and 
accounting conservatism is low when managerial ownership is high.  
 
In family firms, ownership is concentrated and managerial ownership is high. Based 
on Lafond and Roychowdhury’s (2008) finding, it is expected that accounting 
conservatism to be lower for family firms compared to non-family firms. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: The level of accounting conservatism for family firms is lower than it is 
for non-family firms. 
 
Earnings informativeness refers to the extent earnings recognize information that is 
incorporated in stock prices. A strong relationship between earnings and stock returns 
is regarded as high quality financial reporting. Many previous studies measure 
earnings informativeness to assess the quality of financial reporting. Lev and Zarowin 
(1999) examine the quality of financial reporting in the U.S over the twenty year 
period from 1977 to 1996. They report that over the period, earnings informativeness 
has declined suggesting a deteriorating in the quality of financial reporting. Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000) adopt the same measure to examine the quality of financial 
reporting between common-law countries and code-law countries. They find that 
financial reporting in common-law countries is of higher quality. Vafeas (2000) 
documents that earnings informativeness is high for firms with good corporate 
governance mechanisms. Earnings are more informative for firms with effective 
board structure. The results indicate that earnings and stock returns relationship is 
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greater for firms with small board of directors, which is regarded as more effective 
than large board of directors. 
 
Wang (2006), Ali et al. (2006) and Wan Nordin (2009) document that financial 
reporting of family firms is of higher quality than that of non-family firms. Based on 
the evidence, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Earnings informativeness is higher for family firms than it is for non-
family  firms. 
 
3.0 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We gather the data from the company annual reports and financial database. The 
company annual reports are retrieved from the Bursa Malaysia website 
(www.bursamalaysia.com). The financial data is retrieved from the Thomson 
Advance Database.  We use a sample of family firms and non-family firms listed on 
the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia.
2
 We adopt the definition of family firm and non-
family used by Amran (2011). A firm is classified as a family firm when the 
following criteria are met: (1) CEO is the founder or the successor who is related by 
blood or marriage, (2) at least two family members hold management position in the 
company, and (3) family directors have a minimum of 20% interest (direct and 
indirect shareholding) in the company. Firms classified under the finance sector, unit 
trusts and REITS are excluded because of their unique features and business activities 
                                                    
2
 In August 2009, the Main Board and the Second Board of Bursa Malaysia merged, and known as the 
Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. 
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as well as differences in compliance and regulatory requirements. Our final sample 
consists of 2,856 firm-year observations over the period of 2000-2007. 
 
3.2 Measurement Model 
We use Basu’s (1997) measure as our measure of conservatism. Basu defines 
conservatism as earnings capture bad news faster than good news. Using stock returns 
to proxy for good and bad news, Basu expects that in a reverse regression of earnings 
on stock returns, a higher association of earnings with negative stock returns than with 
positive stock returns would be observed. Basu’s regression model is as follow: 
 
 =  +  + 	
 + 
 +  
 
where   is annual earnings deflated by the beginning of period market value, 
 is a 
twelve-month stock return,  is a dummy variable that equals one if stock return is 
negative and equals zero otherwise, and  is the residual term. The coefficient  
measures the sensitivity of earnings to bad news and it is expected to be positive and 
significant when earnings are more sensitive to bad news than to good news. 
 
We extend the Basu (1997) model to include the dummy variable for family firms to 
examine the difference in accounting conservatism between family firms and non-
family firms. The estimating equation is as follow: 
 

 =  +  + 	
 + . 
 + 
+ .  + . 







 is annual earnings deflated by the beginning of period market value, 
 is a dummy variable that equals one if stock return is negative and equals zero 
otherwise, 
 is a twelve-month stock return,  is a dummy variable that 
equals one for family firm and equal zero otherwise, and  is the residual term. In the 
model,  captures the sensitivity to bad news for non-family firms, while  captures 
the marginal effect of sensitivity to bad news for family firms. 
 
We predict that the level of accounting conservatism is lower for family firms than it 
is for non-family firms. Therefore, it is expected that , coefficient on 
. . 
, is negative and statistically significant.  
 
Following Vafeas (2000) and Fan and Wong (2002), earnings informativeness is 
measured by earnings and stock returns relationship. We include the dummy variable 
for family firms to examine the difference in earnings informativeness between family 
firms and non-family firms. The estimating equation is as follow: 
 

 =  +  + 	
 + . 
 +  
 
where 
 is a twelve-month stock return,  is a dummy variable that equals 
one for family firm and equal zero otherwise, 
 is annual earnings deflated by 
the beginning of period market value, and  is the residual term. 	 measures  the 
sensitivity of stock returns to earnings for non-family firms, while  measures the 




We predict earnings informativeness to be higher for family firms than it is for non-
family firms. Therefore, it is expected that  to be positive and significant. 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for regression variables. Stock returns have a 
minimum value of -0.90 and the maximum value of 5.26. Stock returns are right-
skewed where mean value of 0.09 is higher than median value of 0.00. The minimum 
value and the maximum value of earnings are -25.32 and 22.17, respectively. 


















0.09 0.00 0.58 0.27 -0.25 -0.90 5.26 
Earnings 0.03 0.09 1.02 0.15 0.01 -25.32 22.17 
 
 
Table 2 reports the regression results for accounting conservatism. Model 1 examines 
the sensitivity of earnings to good news and bad news for all sample firms. The 
coefficient for good news, 	, is 0.17 and statistically significant at a 1 percent level. 
The differential slope coefficient for bad news, , is 0.34 and statistically significant 
at a 5 percent level. The results indicate that earnings are more sensitive to bad news 
than to good news. The sensitivity of earnings to bad news is 3 (= [0.17 + 0.34] / 
0.17) times greater than that for good news. Hence, the results suggest that accounting 
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conservatism exists for family firms and non-family firms, which indicates high 
quality financial reporting.  
 
Table 2 
Regression Model for Accounting Conservatism between Family and Non-family Firms 
 
 =  ! + "# + $% + &#. % + '()*+,
+  -#. ()*+, + .()*+,. % +  /#. ()*+,. %
+ 0 
 

















































  -0.18 
(0.590) 
*Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 10%. 
(figures in the parentheses are the p-values) 
 
Model 2 examines the sensitivity of earnings to good news and bad news for family 
firms and non-family firms.  measures the sensitivity to bad news for non-family 
firms, while  measures the marginal effect of sensitivity to bad news for family 
firms. The differential slope coefficient on   is 0.38 and statistically significant at a 
5 percent level. The differential slope coefficient on   is -0.18. However, it is not 
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statistically significant. The results indicate that there is no difference in the 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news between family firms and non-family firms. The 
evidence suggests that there is no difference in the level of accounting conservatism 
between family firms and non-family firms. Therefore, the result is not consistent 
with our expectation.  
 
There have been conflicting evidence pertaining to the quality of financial reporting 
of firms with different ownership structure. Earlier studies (such as Fan and Wong, 
2002; Ball et al., 2003) document that firms with concentrated ownership produce low 
quality financial reporting due to entrenchment effect. Furthermore, there is no 
demand for high quality financial reporting as information asymmetry is resolved 
through private communication. Recent studies (such as Wang, 2006; Ali et al.,2007), 
however, suggest that family firms, which have concentrated ownership,  produce 
high quality financial reporting to protect firms’ reputation as well as to avoid 
negative market valuation. Our results support the latter. There is no evidence to 
support that the quality of financial reporting, as measured by accounting 
conservatism, of family firms is less superior than that of non-family firms. It appears 
that family firms are now concerned with the quality of financial reporting.  
 
Table 3 reports regression results for earnings informativeness for non-family firms 
and family firms. 	 measures the sensitivity of stock returns to earnings for non-
family firms, while  measures the marginal effect of sensitivity of stock returns to 
earnings for family firms. The slope coefficient on 	 is 0.04 and statistically 
significant at a 1 percent level. The differential slope coefficient on  is 0.09 and 
statistically significant at a 10 percent level. The results indicate that the sensitivity of 
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stock returns to earnings is greater for family firms. Stock returns for family firms are 
3.25 (= [0.04 + 0.09] / 0.04) more sensitive to earnings than non-family firms. 
Therefore, the results confirm our expectation that earnings informativeness is higher 
for family firms than it is for non-family firms. As far as earnings informativeness is 
concerned, the results in Table 3 provide evidence that the quality of financial 
reporting for family firms is of higher quality than it is for non-family firms.  
 
Table 3 
Regression Model for Earnings Informativeness for Family and Non-family Firms 
 
% =  ! + "()*+, + $ +  &()*+,.  + 0 
 
Variable β  
Constant   0.08*** 
(0.000) 
Family  0.02 
(0.427) 
EARN 	 0.04*** 
(0.000) 
FAMILY.EARN  0.09* 
(0.087) 
*Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 10%. 
(figures in the parentheses are the p-values) 
 
Our results are consistent with the earlier studies (Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2006; Wan 
Nordin, 2009) that show family firms produce higher financial reporting quality than 
non-family firms. It appears that there is a change in market valuation toward the 
quality of financial reporting of family firms. Previously, investors regard the 
financial reporting as of low quality and they put less emphasis on the information in 
setting stock prices. However, investors now regard the financial information 






In this paper we examine accounting conservatism and earnings informativeness for 
family firms and non-family firms. Accounting conservatism and earnings 
informativeness are important elements in good quality financial reporting. Using a 
sample of Malaysian public listed firms during the period 2000-2007, we find that 
there is no difference in the level of accounting conservatism between family firms 
and non-family firms. With regard to earnings informativeness, we find that earnings 
informativeness is higher for family firms than it is for non-family firms. The 
empirical results suggest that the quality of financial reporting of family firms is not 
of lower quality than that of family firms. Instead, the empirical result suggests that 
investors value earnings information reported by family firms higher than that 
reported by non-family firms. Interestingly, our study provides evidence to support 
recent studies (Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007; Wan Nordin, 2009) that document family 
firms are associated with high quality financial reporting.  
In 2007, Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was revised with the aim to 
strengthen the board of directors and audit committees, and to ensure that the board of 
directors and audit committees discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively. It 
is likely the revision in corporate governance code to result in better financial 
reporting quality. Further research is necessary to understand the impact of the 
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